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Abstract
We study the dynamic pricing problem faced by a monopolistic retailer who sells
a storable product to forward-looking consumers. In this framework, the two major
pricing policies (or mechanisms) studied in the literature are the preannounced (com-
mitment) pricing policy and the contingent (threat or history dependent) pricing policy.
We analyse and compare these pricing policies in the setting where the good can be
purchased along a finite time horizon in indivisible atomic quantities. First, we show
that, given linear storage costs, the retailer can compute an optimal preannounced pric-
ing policy in polynomial time by solving a dynamic program. Moreover, under such a
policy, we show that consumers do not need to store units in order to anticipate price
rises. Second, under the contingent pricing policy rather than the preannounced pricing
mechanism, (i) prices could be lower, (ii) retailer revenues could be higher, and (iii) con-
sumer surplus could be higher. This result is surprising, in that these three facts are in
complete contrast to the case of a retailer selling divisible storable goods [Dudine et al.,
2006]. Third, we quantify exactly how much more profitable a contingent policy could
be with respect to a preannounced policy. Specifically, for a market with N consumers,
a contingent policy can produce a multiplicative factor of Ω(logN) more revenues than
a preannounced policy, and this bound is tight.
1 Introduction
The problem of determining an optimal pricing policy for a monopolistic retailer has attracted
the attention of many researchers from Economics and Operations Research. These problems
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are generally studied in a dynamic game setting in which the players are the single retailer and
the consumers. At each period, the seller sets a selling price (under pre-announced pricing
all prices are set in advance) and buyers decide whether to buy or wait (and potentially buy
a product later). This interplay between a retailer and consumers may sometimes lead to
surprising equilibria. Some relevant questions in this topic are: What does the price path
look like in an equilibrium? How profitable can the retailer be, and what pricing policy should
it use? Is it possible to compute the optimal pricing policy efficiently? In this paper we study
the dynamic pricing problem faced by a retailer (a monopolist) who sells storable goods to
forward-looking consumers along a finite time horizon. Storable goods are goods that can
be stored for a long period but then loses all value after its first use. Prominent examples
of storable goods include non-perishable grocery items and many natural commodities, for
example, oil and natural gas. A less conspicuous example concerns digital goods. Digital
goods are durable, but the technology often exists to make them perishable and, thus, convert
them into storable goods. 1
Dynamic pricing, a practice which is very common in most industries, can be seen as a weak
form of price discrimination. The retailer does not dictate how consumers are segmented,
but rather consumers segment themselves by self-selecting the time (and corresponding price)
at which they prefer to buy the item. A classic and well studied dynamic pricing problem
occurs when a monopolist sells a durable good to strategic consumers.2. A natural question
in this setting is whether the seller is better-off by pre-announcing all future prices (i.e. price-
commitment) rather than using a price-contingent strategy (i.e. revealing prices dynamically).
Ronald Coase [1972] conjectured that a durable good monopolist who lacks price commitment
cannot sell the good above the competitive price. Stokey [1979] then showed that the optimal
preannounced pricing policy consists of setting a fixed price. An intuitive argument of why
a preannounced pricing policy might be beneficial to the retailer is the following: in an
environment with dynamic pricing, consumers may sometimes hesitate whether they should
buy a product today or wait for a potential discount in the future. In some contexts, this
may hurt the seller’s profit. On the other hand, a pre-announced pricing policy gives a seller
the power of commitment and thus, can induce consumers to buy at a high price since they
can be certain that prices will not drop enough to make it beneficial to wait.
The Coase conjecture was first proven by Gul et al. [1986] under an infinite time horizon model
with non-atomic consumers. However, the conjecture relied upon several assumptions, such as
that the time between periods approaches zero and that there is an continuum of consumers.
Since then, there have been several studies regarding the performance of different pricing
policies for various economic models for durable goods, perishable goods, under different time
1A firm may wish to reduce the lifespan of a durable good to avoid a Coasian outcome, that is, one where
the firm loses all monopoly power. Indeed, Amazon has recently been granted a US patent (8,364,595) for a
second-hand market in digital goods that restricts the number of times a good can be resold, that is, limits
the longevity of the goods. Apple has applied for a similar patent (US 20130060616 A1).
2A durable good is a long-lasting good that can be “stored” and consumed repeatedly over time. Examples
include digital goods, land and, to a large degree, housing, metals, electronic goods, etc.
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horizons. Gu¨th and Ritzberger [1998] studied a finite horizon model with a continuum of
consumers (i.e. non-atomic demand) and showed that when consumer valuations follow a
uniform distribution, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, as period lengths approach
zero, in which the monopolist profits converge to the static monopoly profits discounted to
the beginning of the game. Bagnoli et al. [1989] studied the durable good monopoly problem
in which there are finite (atomic) consumers (i.e. discrete demand). When the time horizon is
infinite, they proved a surprising result: the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in which the duropolist extracts all the consumer surplus. This equilibrium refutes the Coase
conjecture when there is a finite set of atomic buyers and an infinite time horizon. Indeed, it
shows there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where duropoly profits exceed static
monopoly profits by an unbounded factor. Berbeglia et al. [2014] studied the same model
as Bagnoli et al. [1989] and proved that when there is a finite time horizon the monopolist
profits cannot exceed twice the static monopoly profits. A major difference between the
durable good literature (in particular Bagnoli et al. [1989] and Berbeglia et al. [2014]) and
our paper is that in the durable good monopoly problems, consumers have a single demand
and the valuation is assigned for the whole game. In our model, however, consumers can have
a demand of multiple units and the valuation obtained obtained is time-dependent. We also
showed in Section 4.2 that the duropoly model of Berbeglia et al. [2014] can be seen as a
special case of the storable good model presented in this paper. Nevertheless, we showed that
the conclusions with regards to the benefits of price commitment obtained in Berbeglia et al.
[2014] do not generalize to this broader class of models.
Dasu and Tong [2010] analyzed preannounced pricing policies for a retailer for the case in
which consumers are finite and the number of items are limited (i.e. there is an availability
constraint). The authors showed that dynamic pricing (through preannounced pricing) is
beneficial for the retailer, but the benefit decreases as the market size increases. Su [2007]
studied contingent (subgame perfect or threat) pricing policies in a finite time horizon model
where consumers, who arrive continuously, are heterogeneous in their valuation and in their
patience. The author characterized the structure of optimal pricing policies and showed that,
depending on what population type dominates the market, prices are increasing or decreasing.
Aviv and Pazgal [2008] studied contingent pricing and preannounced pricing equilibria for a
related two-period model of a retailer selling a finite number of items to strategic consumers
that arrive under a Poison process. The authors proved that a preannounced policy, with
respect to contingent pricing, can increase monopoly profits by up to eight percent. Li [2001]
consider optimal pricing policies for another model where items are also limited inspired
by the revenue management problem faced by airlines. The potential benefit of strategic
capacity rationing under preannounced pricing was analyzed by Liu and van Ryzin [2008]
in a two period pricing model of a durable good. Their main result is that rationing can
be beneficial for the retailer but only when consumers are risk-adverse. Correa et al. [2016]
studied a new type of pricing mechanism so called contingent preannounced pricing in which
the retailer commits to a price menu which states what would be the future price as a function
of the number of available inventory. The authors showed that under this pricing policy, there
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exists a unique equilibrium when there is a single unit of inventory, but multiple equilibria may
exist otherwise. Computational experiments showed that the contingent preannounced pricing
outperforms previously proposed pricing mechanisms. Very recently, Surasvadi et al. [2017]
examined a contingent price markdown mechanism with guaranteed reservation in which the
retailer sells a limited number of items over a finite time horizon. The authors have identified
market conditions in which the proposed mechanism outperforms a price commitment policy.
Other models of durable good markets that incorporate multi-generation products and the
effects of price sensitivity has been studied by Kuo and Huang [2012] and Liberali et al. [2011]
respectively.
A related setting in which there is a complex dynamic interaction between a retailer and
the consumers is when the good is storable – a storable good is a good that can be stored
prior to consumption but it is not durable as it perishes upon consumption. Consequently,
as stated, such a good can be stored for a long period but then loses all value after its first
use. Prominent examples of storable goods include non-perishable grocery items and many
natural commodities, for example, oil and natural gas. A less conspicuous example concerns
digital goods. As with durable good markets, the consumers in a storable good market can
strategically time their purchases by taking into account current and expected future prices. In
a storable good market, a consumer who observes a low price promotion sale, may increase her
purchases not only to augment the current consumption level (the consumption effect) but also
to stockpile the good for future consumption (the stockpiling effect). There is a large amount
of evidence from empirical work showing that the stockpiling effect – also known as demand
anticipation – is non-negligible in markets for storable goods. For example, Pesendorfer
[2002] investigated supermarket price reductions for ketchup products in Springfield, Missouri.
His main finding is that demand at low prices depends on past prices, which suggests the
existence of a stockpiling effect. Similarly, Hendel and Nevo [2006] examined the price and
demand dynamics of soft drinks, laundry detergents, and yogurt from nine supermarkets in
the US. This analysis also showed that demand increases during price reductions are, in part,
due the stockpiling effect. To capture the potential for stockpiling, the models of storable
good markets assume that consumers have access to inventory space for an associated cost.3
Again, the question of whether the seller is better-off by pre-announcing all future prices
(i.e. price-commitment) rather than using a price-contingent strategy (i.e. revealing prices
dynamically) is also important in this setting. While it is generally the case that firms do
not pre-announce future prices in most markets, there are several examples where, directly or
indirectly they provide an approximation of the pricing schedule. In clothes retailing, consider
for example the American luxury department store Nordstrom. As stated in Elmaghraby et al.
[2009], Nordstrom pre-announces several weeks in advance, the starting dates of its July
sales. While the exact price reduction is not announced exactly, consumers know that most
items would be 25-50 percent off. In the airline industry, some airlines provide mechanisms
to encourage consumers not to strategically schedule their purchases. For example, South
West pre-announced future prices for some flights [Heskett and Sasser, 2010]. Other airlines,
3These storable goods models are also referred to as dynamic inventory models.
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such as easyJet, do not pre-announce explicitly their prices, but commit to a monotone
increasing price policy [Koenigsberg et al., 2008]. In the theatre industry, Tereyag˘og˘lu et al.
[2017] empirically tested whether a performing art organization could increase sales by using
a pre-announced pricing strategy. Their results suggest that for this organization, price-
commitment is better than a contingent pricing policy. In other industries, pre-announced
pricing mechanisms and dynamic pricing policies coexist, we provide two examples. The
first one is the multi-billion dollar industry of cloud computing services such as Amazon web
services. These platforms provide several long-term contract services where prices are pre-
announced, together with short term contracts whose prices are contingent to the current
demand (spot market pricing). The second example is transportation services such as those
provided by Uber and Lyft, where prices are typically pre-announced, but the policy may
switch to a dynamic pricing scheme in situations with high demand.
Dudine et al. [2006] studied a market where the retailer sells a storable good to consumers with
time-dependent demand over an arbitrary (but finite) number of time periods. They proved
that, under some mild assumptions on consumer demand, if the retailer uses a preannounced
price mechanism then consumers will not stockpile any goods in equilibrium. They also showed
that (i) prices are higher, (ii) profits are lower, and (iii) consumer surplus is lower if the retailer
uses a contingent pricing mechanism rather than a preannounced price mechanism. These
results also suggest, unlike the classical results that proved the Coase conjecture in durable
good settings, that monopoly power in storable good markets leads to several inefficiencies.
The results of Dudine et al. [2006] have later been extended to other settings of a storable
good market, namely a two-level vertically integrated monopoly [Nie, 2009a], and a duopoly
market model [Nie, 2009b].
A major assumption in the storable good market model of Dudine et al. [2006] is that the good
is infinitesimally divisible. In addition, they consider that either there is a single consumer in
the market who can always obtain some positive additional utility by consuming an additional
fraction of the good (no matter how small that fraction is), or that there is a continuum of
non-atomic buyers. In our paper, we will relax those assumption by imposing that goods are
not divisible. Other models for storable goods studied in the literature include a continuous
time stochastic inventory model for a commodity traded in a spot market [Chiarolla et al.,
2015] and a model where the storable good has a fixed shelf-life [Herbon, 2014]. The liter-
ature of lot-sizing is also related. Lot-sizing models are constructed to optimize production
planning and inventory management also in a multi-period setting. An important differ-
ence, however, is that in lot-sizing problems consumers are not strategic and therefore the
optimization problem is not subject to equilibrium constraints (see, e.g. Drexl and Kimms
[1997], Jans and Degraeve [2008], and Robinson et al. [2009]).
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1.1 Contributions
In this paper we consider the model of a retailer selling storable goods used in Dudine et al.
[2006], but in which the items are indivisible. Specifically, we assume that either (1) there is
a finite (possibly very large) number of buyers with a unitary demand per period or (2) there
is a single buyer with an arbitrary demand per period, but can only obtain value from an
integral number of items.
Our main contributions are as follows. We first characterize the optimal preannounced pricing
strategy for the retailer. We then show that it can be computed efficiently and that, under
this preannounced price mechanism, the consumers will not stockpile the good. We next show
that it is possible for (i) prices to be lower, (ii) retailer’s profits to be higher and (iii) the
consumer surplus to be higher, if the retailer uses a contingent pricing mechanism rather than
a preannounced price mechanism. These last three results are surprising, since they are in
complete contrast to the case of a retailer for divisible storable goods [Dudine et al., 2006].
We then quantitatively compare the profitability of the preannounced price and contingent
pricing mechanisms. Specifically, for a market with N consumers, a contingent pricing mech-
anism can generate Ω(logN) times more profits than an optimal preannounced price mecha-
nism, and this bound is tight. This is notable because previous models with a finite number of
periods have the property that the contingent pricing mechanism cannot significantly outper-
form the preannounced price mechanism. In particular, we explain how our result contrasts
with related results for a durable good retailer. Finally, we examine the setting where inven-
tory costs are concave. Interestingly, the consumers may now utilise storage when the retailer
uses a preannounced price mechanism.
2 The Model
Consider a retailer facing consumers with demands for a consumable good over T time periods.
The retailer can produce units of the good at a unitary cost u and wishes to select prices
{p1, p2, . . . , pT} to produce sale quantities {q1, q2, . . . , qT} that maximize profits,
∑T
t=1 pt · qt.
We assume, without loss of generality, that u = 0 and consequently, profit and revenue
are interchangeable in this setting. For a perishable good with one-period shelf-life, the
corresponding optimization problem consists of optimizing each time period independently, as
the goods bought or produced in one period cannot be consumed in the next one. But observe
that as the goods shelf-life grows, the problem becomes more complicated as consumers can
strategically buy items in one period only to consume them at a later date. Storability
offers the consumers the opportunity to purchase the good before they actually wish to use
it. Indeed, this option is desirable if the resultant price savings exceed storage costs. In
accounting for this possibility, the retailer’s optimization problem now becomes non-separable.
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We consider two cases for this problem: the single-buyer and the multi-buyer settings. In
the former, all the demand comes from a single buyer whose (time-depedent) value obtained
depends on the quantity of indivisible items consumed. In the latter, there is a finite number
of consumers, each having a single (indivisible) unitary demand per period. In previous
studies, the results obtained from these two settings are essentially identical. However, for an
indivisible good, these two settings are not equivalent and may produce different outcomes.
Specifically, in Section 4, we show an example where, in the case of a single buyer with multiple
units of demand, the retailer can extract more profit than in the case where there are multiple
buyers with unitary demand. Furthermore, in Section 5, we show that the two settings have
different outcomes with respect to the use of storage under concave storage costs.
Our interest lies in analysing and comparing two standard pricing mechanisms: the prean-
nounced price mechanism and the contingent pricing mechanism. In the preannounced price
mechanism, the retailer publicly announces in advance (that is, at time t = 0) a price sched-
ule {p1, p2, . . . , pT} where pt is the per unit price in period t. The consumers can then make
their purchasing and storage decisions based upon these prices. In the contingent pricing
mechanism, the retailer announces prices sequentially over time. Thus, the announced price
pt = p(H, t) may depend not only on the current time period t, but also on past history H.
Once the price at period pt is announced, the consumer (or consumers) must decide how many
units to purchase and store without knowledge of future prices (the consumer also has the
opportunity to purchase goods in the future, even in the case where she has already purchased
goods earlier in the game).
For such a sequential game, the solutions we examine are pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria
(SPNE). In particular, this restricts our attention to credible contingent pricing mechanisms.
It worth mentioning that the decision on which pricing mechanism to use may affect not
only the retailer profits, but also the total purchases (i.e. observable demand), as well as the
consumer surplus.
Before we proceed to explain precisely the two models (single-buyer and multiple-buyers),
we enumerate several assumptions which are needed. (i) The retailer has enough capacity
to satisfy all demand; (ii) The per unit cost for the retailer is constant over time and it
is set to zero (this is without loss of generality, as one can always normalize it); (iii) The
retailer does not incur in inventory cost (or equivalently, it can receive the items from the
distributor in every period without an ordering cost); (iv) the retailer and the consumers
know the distribution of the consumer valuations; (v) all consumers are known at time zero
(no new consumers appear in the game); (vi) consumers do not incur in an ordering cost or
delivery cost.
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2.1 The Single-Buyer Case.
We begin with case where the retailer faces a unique buyer (monopsonist) for its good. Let
the value the buyer receives from consuming x units of the good at period t be given by the
function U(x, t). Units are assumed to be indivisible, and therefore the domain of the utility
function U(x, t) is N× [T ]. Assume the buyer faces a set of prices {p1 . . . , pT} and that the
storage cost is c ≥ 0 dollars per unit per time period. The consumer problem then consists
of choosing the consumption quantities {x1, x2, . . . , xT}, the number of units purchased per
period {q1, . . . , qT}, and the storage levels {S1, S2, . . . , ST}. These are chosen to maximize
her total utility
T∑
t=1
(U(xt, t)− pt · qt − c · St) (1)
subject to the storage constraints that St = St−1 + qt − xt, for all t = 1, . . . , T where S0 = 0.
The retailer selects the prices {p1 . . . , pT} in order to maximise the resulting profits
∑T
t=1 pt ·
qt. As stated, for the preannounced price mechanism the prices are chosen in advance and
for the contingent pricing mechanism the prices are chosen sequentially. In analyzing these
two mechanisms we make the following standard assumptions. First we assume the buyer’s
valuation function U(x, t) is non-decreasing in x. Second, we assume the marginal valuation
function is non-increasing in x. Specifically, let V (x, t) = U(x, t) − U(x − 1, t) represent the
marginal value obtained by consuming x units of the good at period t. Then we have that
V (x, t) is non-increasing in x. We also assume that there exists H ∈ N such that V (H, t) = 0
for all t ∈ T . No other restrictions are imposed on the consumer utilities. For notational
purposes, we set V (0, t) = L for all t ∈ [T ] where L is a huge number.
2.2 The Multi-Buyer Case.
Next consider the set-up for the multi-buyer case. We now have a set of N consumers each
seeking to maximize their own utility. Each consumer i has a demand of at most one unit
per period and the value she obtains if she consumes the unit at period t is ui,t. A consumer
i may, however, purchase multiple units qi,t of the indivisible good in any time period and
store them for future consumption. Again, there is a storage cost of c per period and per
unit stored. This time the retailer chooses prices {p1, . . . , pT} to maximize
∑T
t=1 pt · qt, where
qt =
∑
i qi,t is the total number of items sold in period t.
For the preannounced price mechanism, the consumers make their purchasing/storage deci-
sions based upon the entire set of prices. For the contingent pricing mechanism, in each time
period, the consumers decide (simultaneously) their purchasing/storage quantities for that
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period, given the current price. As we shall see, these decisions impose constraints on the
retailer’s optimization problem. In particular, for the contingent pricing mechanism these
constraints force solutions to correspond to pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE).
To simplify notation, let σt : [N ]→ [N ] denote the permutation that ranks the N consumers
in decreasing values of their utilities in period t and let vi,t = uσ−1(i),t for all i ∈ [N ] and all
t ∈ [T ]. Again, we set v0,t = L where L is a huge number.
2.3 An Example
In this section, we present a simple example to illustrate the proposed model and the concepts
involved. Then, in Section 2.4, we consider the continuous version of the same example (i.e.
the case in which the goods are divisible) to provide an insight of why the indivisibility of the
goods alters some of the results obtained by Dudine et al. [2006].
Consider a two-period game with a per unit storage cost of c = 1 and with consumer valuations
given in Table 2. Here we assume that we are in the multi-buyer case with N = 2; however,
it is straightforward to check that our analysis also applies if there is a single-buyer whose
marginal utilities for each extra unit are described by the same table.
Table 1: A small example
Consumer Value at t=1 Value at t=2
1 17 15
2 10 4
We first calculate the optimal preannounced pricing strategy for this game. Let p1 and p2
denote an optimal sequence of prices under the preannounced pricing policy for periods 1 and
2 respectively. We claim that no consumer will ever buy a unit at period 1 and then store it
for consumption in period 2. Otherwise we must have p2 > p1 + 1 for it to be beneficial to
buy early and pay the storage cost. But this cannot be optimal for the retailer as it would
then benefit from setting p2 = p1 + 1. It follows that the optimal choice for p1 must either
be p1 = 17 in which case only consumer 1 buys, or be p1 = 10 in which case both consumers
buy. In the former case, the optimal choice for p2 would be p2 = 15 yielding a total profit
of 17 · 1 + 15 · 1 = 32. In the latter case, the optimal period two price p2 cannot be higher
than 11, otherwise consumer 1 would use storage. Consequently, the optimal price is p2 = 11,
which yields the retailer a profit of 10 · 2 + 11 · 1 = 31. Therefore the optimal preannounced
price strategy yields a profit of 32 and consists of setting prices p1 = 17 and p2 = 15.
Next we calculate the optimal contingent pricing mechanism. Because prices and actions are
chosen sequentially we can compute the optimal contingent pricing mechanism by reasoning
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backwards from the final time period. So consider time t = 2. In order to select p2 the retailer
will base its decision on the set of items currently stored. If consumer 1 has not stored an
item from period 1 to 2 then the retailer will set p2 = 15, regardless of the prior decisions
made by consumer 2. Knowing this, consumer 1 will purchase two items in period 1 provided
p1 + c ≤ 15, that is p1 ≤ 14. This observation leads to the following four possibilities. (i)
The retailer sets p1 = 17. Consumer 1 then purchases one item in each time period giving
a profit of 17 · 1 + 15 · 1 = 32. (ii) The retailer sets p1 = 14 and consumer 1 purchases two
units. Given this, the retailer then charges p2 = 4 and consumer 2 buys one unit in the last
period. This gives a profit of 14 · 2 + 4 · 1 = 32. (iii) The retailer sets p1 = 10 and consumer
1 purchases two units and consumer 2 purchases one unit. Again, the retailer then charges
p2 = 4 and consumer 2 buys one unit in the last period. This gives a profit of 10 ·3+4 ·1 = 34.
(iv) In order to induce consumer 2 to purchase two units in period 1 the retailer will have to
charge p1 ≤ 3 giving profits of at most 3 · 4 = 12. Note that option (iii) is a credible threat.
If consumer 1 refuses to buy two units in period 1 her utility will fall as the price would then
rise to p2 = 15. If consumer 2 refuses to buy one unit in period 1 then her utility will be
unchanged. Thus, the optimal contingent pricing mechanism gives total profits of 34.
We now make some observations about the example described. First, observe that the equi-
librium under the contingent pricing mechanism involves storage whereas the preannounced
pricing solution does not. This observation is in fact general in our model (and it also holds
under the model of Dudine et al. [2006]). We prove in Section 3 that regardless of the number
of time periods, the valuation functions, or whether the game is single-buyer or multi-buyer,
there is an optimal preannounced pricing strategy that induces no storage. Thus, in terms
of storage costs, the preannounced pricing mechanism is more efficient that the contingent
pricing mechanism. Second, the prices under the preannounced pricing policy are higher than
under the contingent pricing mechanism in each period. Observe as well that the retailer
profits are lower under preannounced pricing (32) than contingent pricing (34). Finally, the
consumer surplus (the total value obtained by consumers minus money transfers to the re-
tailer and storage costs) is lower under the preannounced pricing policy (0) than with the
contingent pricing mechanism (11). The last three observations are surprising as Dudine et al.
[2006] prove that none of those three statements can be true if the retailer is selling a divis-
ible storable good. The following section provides insights about why it makes a difference
whether the goods are divisible or indivisible.
2.4 The Impact of Item Divisibility
In order to provide an insight of what is the impact of good divisibility, we consider the model
of Dudine et al. [2006] and analyze an example that corresponds to the one described in the
previous section. In Dudine et al. [2006] model, there is a unit measure of consumers, and the
value of consuming an amount x ∈ [0, 1] at period t is ut(x), where ut(x) is an increasing and
continuous function in [0, 1]. For this example, the valuation functions ut(x) are obtained by
10
setting ut(x) =
∫ x
0
Ut(x)dx where the functions Ut(x) are defined as follows:
Ut=1(x) =


17 if 0 6 x 6 0.5
10 if 0.5 < x 6 1
Ut=2(x) =


15 if 0 6 x 6 0.5
4 if 0.5 < x 6 1
Under the preannounced pricing policy it easy to verify that the optimal prices and quantities
bought are the same as in the divisible good settings. Specifically, at period 1, p1 = 17, and
a measure of 0.5 consumers buy and consume; and at period 2, p2 = 15 and a 0.5 measure of
consumers from period 2 buy and consume. Again here, no storage is used, and the retailer
revenue is 17
2
+ 15
2
= 16 4.
Next consider contingent pricing. We now show that the price contingent equilibrium we
found under the indivisible model cannot be maintained in the Dudine et al. [2006] model.
The potential equilibrium that corresponds to the equilibrium for the divisible good model
is that at t = 1, p1=10 and all the complete unit measure of consumers from t = 1 buy, as
well as 0.5 measure of consumers from period 2 (which they store for later consumption at
period 2). Then, at t = 2, we have p2 = 4 and the remaining 0.5 measure of consumers buy.
The reason why this is not an equilibrium is because the measure of period 2 consumers who
store the good from t = 1 to t = 2 is so large that the retailer will then set a price p2 = 4.
To understand this, let y 6 0.5 denote the measure of consumers who buy at t = 1 for price
10 and store the good for t = 2. Then, the price at t = 2 would still be 4 if and only if
the retailer obtains more profit by charging 4 dollars to the remaining measure consumers
instead of charging 15 dollars to the remaining measure of consumers whose valuation is 15.
Therefore, we have that 4 · (1− y) > 15 · (0.5− y). Solving this gives y > 7
22
.
Thus, if the retailer sets price p1 = 10 at t = 1, all consumers from period 1 buy and a
measure of 7
22
consumers of t = 2 buy and store. Then, at period t = 2, the retailer sets price
p2 = 4 and all remaining consumers buy. The retailer revenue under this specific contingent
pricing policy is then 10 · (1 + 7
22
) + 4 · 15
22
= 175
11
≃ 15.91 < 16. It can be shown that the
optimal contingent pricing strategy is to set p1 = 17 and p2 = 15 so the retailer revenue
under contingent pricing in this example is the same as the preannounced pricing policy (see
Dudine et al. [2006] for the general characterization of both pricing policies under this model).
Table 2 summarizes the differences between the two models.
4The reason the profit is not 32 as in the case where goods are not divisible is simply because of the scaling:
the demand in this example is scaled to a unit per period, which is half of the example from section 2.3
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Table 2: Differences between Divisible and Indivisible Goods: An Example
Mechanism-Model Retailer Profit Consumer surplus Prices
PA/Indivisible 32 0 p1 = 17 p2 = 15
CP/Indivisible 34 11 p1 = 10 p2 = 4
PA/Divisible 16 0 p1 = 17 p2 = 15
CP/Divisible 16 0 p1 = 17 p2 = 15
In essence; using a contingent pricing policy; the retailer can sometimes extract more revenue
when the goods are indivisible by performing some price discrimination that the consumer
cannot overcome (under the indivisible model one unit was bought at 10, whereas the other
unit was bought at 4). If the retailer tries to perform a similar price discrimination under the
divisible goods setting, the consumer can finely optimize the (continuous) quantities bought,
which makes the price discrimination less effective.
3 Optimal Preannounced Pricing Mechanisms
In this section we derive an efficient procedure to calculate an optimal sequence of prices
{p1, . . . , pT} (price at period t is pt) that the retailer could announce to maximize its revenue
under preannounced pricing. Furthermore, the optimal price sequence is the same regardless
of whether we are in the single-buyer or multi-buyer case.
We begin with the following simple lemma that holds for the multi-buyer and the single buyer
settings.
Lemma 3.1. Let {p1, . . . , pT} be any sequence of preannounced prices. If sales at period t
are positive then pt is finite and pt 6 pt′ + (t− t
′) · c for all t′ < t.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that at period t there are positive sales (i.e.
qt > 0) but it holds that pt > pt′+(t− t
′) ·c for some t′ < t. We consider the single-buyer case.
Following (1), the consumer utility is U =
∑T
τ=1 (U(xτ , τ)− pτ · qτ − c · Sτ ) where xτ denotes
the items consumed in period τ and Sτ = Sτ−1 + qτ − xτ represents the number of items
stored from period τ to period τ + 1. Suppose now that the consumer modifies her strategy
composed of consumption decisions x′1, . . . , x
′
T ; purchasing decisions q
′
1, . . . , q
′
T , which in turn
leads to an update of the storage values S ′1, . . . , S
′
T . First, we leave the consumption decisions
the same they were before: x′τ = xτ for all τ = 1, . . . , T . Second, we modify the purchasing
decisions by setting q′t′ = qt′ + qt; q
′
t = 0 and maintaining the same purchase quantities on
the remaining periods: q′τ = qτ for all τ = 1, . . . , T with τ 6= t
′ and τ 6= t. As a result of
this change, the storage quantities also change as follows: S ′τ = Sτ for all τ = 1, . . . , t
′ − 1,
S ′τ = Sτ + qt for all τ = t
′, . . . , t− 1, and S ′τ = Sτ for all τ = t, . . . , T . In words, this change
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consists of bringing forward the period t purchases to period t′. The utility obtained using
the new strategy is
U ′ =
T∑
τ=1
(U(xτ , τ)− pτ · q
′
τ − c · S
′
τ )
=
T∑
τ=1
(U(xτ , τ))−
t′−1∑
τ=1
(pτ · qτ + c · Sτ )−
t∑
τ=t′
(pτ · q
′
τ + c · S
′
τ )
−
T∑
τ=t+1
(pτ · qτ + c · Sτ )
Where the second equality follows because q′τ = qτ and S
′
τ = Sτ for all τ = 1, . . . , t
′ − 1, t +
1, . . . , T .
We will now show that U ′ > U . Indeed:
U ′ − U =
t∑
τ=t′
(pτ · qτ + c · Sτ )−
t∑
τ=t′
(pτ · q
′
τ + c · S
′
τ )
= pt′ · qt′ + c · St′ +
t−1∑
τ=t′+1
(pτ · qτ + c · Sτ ) + pt · qt + c · St
− (pt′ · q
′
t′ + c · S
′
t′)−
t−1∑
τ=t′+1
(pτ · q
′
τ + c · S
′
τ )− (pt · q
′
t + c · S
′
t)
= pt′ · qt′ + c · St′ +
t−1∑
τ=t′+1
(pτ · qτ + c · Sτ ) + pt · qt + c · St
− (pt′ · (qt′ + qt) + c · (St′ + qt))−
t−1∑
τ=t′+1
(pτ · qτ + c · (Sτ + qt))− (pt · 0 + c · St)
= −pt′ · qt − c · qt −
t−1∑
τ=t′+1
(c · qt) + pt · qt
= qt (pt − pt′ − (t− t
′) · c)
> 0.
Above, the third equality is obtained by replacing the new purchased quantities q′ and the
new storage quantities S ′ as a function of the original strategy. Finally, the strict inequality
at the end is due to our assumption that pt > pt′ + (t− t
′) · c. This is a contradiction, as the
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consumer would have obtained a strictly higher utility U ′ by switching to the new proposed
strategy.
We note that the argument used to prove the lemma also applied to the multiple buyer case.
Indeed, in that setting each of the consumers who bought at period t can be better off by
moving forward the purchase to period t′ for exactly the same reasons.
The following lemma shows that under preannounced pricing there is no wasteful storage.
This “storage-proof” property of the preannounced pricing mechanism extends the result of
Dudine et al. [2006] to the case of indivisible demand.
Lemma 3.2. There always exists a revenue maximising preannounced pricing strategy in
which there is no storage. This pricing strategy is the same for the single-buyer and the
multiple-buyer settings.
Proof. Take any optimal preannounced pricing strategy {p1, . . . , pT} in which the consumer
(or consumers) use the storage option. We show that there is another optimal preannounced
pricing strategy that requires less storage. The theorem will follow. Let t be the first time
period where qt > xt. Thus a consumer stores at least one unit of the good between period t
and period t+ 1. We may assume in the case of a tie that the consumer(s) selects an option
with the least storage. By the rationality of each consumer, we then have that pt+1 > pt+c. By
Lemma 3.1, we then have that qt+1 = 0. Now suppose the retailer modifies its preannounced
policy by setting pt+1 = pt + c. Observe first that consumption in periods 1 to t will not
change. Second, in the single-buyer case the consumer now prefers to purchase qt−xt units in
period t+ 1 rather than buying them earlier and storing them. In the multi-buyer case there
are qt − xt consumers who previously bought a unit to store at period t and now prefer to
purchase it in period t+1. Thirdly, the purchases made from period t+2 are unaffected by this
price change; if it is now preferable to buy additional units in period t+1 then each consumer
would have originally benefited by making such purchases in period t. This modified pricing
strategy cannot decrease the retailer profits (if c > 0 then profits strictly increase).
Now recall that in the multiple-buyer setting, vi,t is the value of the i
th consumer (ranked in
decreasing order of their valuation in time period t). In the single-buyer setting, in order to
unify notation, we let vi,t = V (i, t) (that is the marginal value of consuming x units of the
good at period t) and let the value of H ∈ N such that V (H, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T be equal to
N + 1.
Lemma 3.2 allows us to write the retailer’s problem as follows. The formulation is valid for
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the single-buyer model as well as for the multiple-buyer setting.
max
T∑
t=1
pt · qt
s.t. pt 6 vqt,t ∀t
pt ≤ pt′ + (t− t
′) · c ∀t′ < t if qt > 0
qt ∈ Z
+ ∀t
Here qt is a non-negative integer representing the number of items sold at time t. For the
consumer to desire this amount, the price at time t must be at most the corresponding
marginal value – this gives the first constraint. The second constraint states that if there are
sales in period t then the price pt cannot be more than the total cost of purchasing a good
in an earlier period and storing it until time t. Recall that we set v0,t = L. Thus, if qt = 0
we may set pt = L; this cannot decrease the objective function as it can only weaken the
restrictions imposed by the second set of constraints.
The following theorem is crucial for the construction of the polynomial-time algorithm to
compute an optimal preannounced pricing strategy.
Theorem 3.3. There exists optimal preannounced pricing sequence p1, . . . , pT such that for
each t, we have pt = vj,s + (t− s) · c for some s 6 t and some 0 ≤ j ≤ N .
Proof. Take an optimal sequence of preannounced pricing sequence (p1, . . . , pT ) that do not
require storage. If these do not satisfy the requirements of the theorem then take smallest
time t such that pt 6= vj,s + (t− s) · c for any s 6 t and for any j 6 N . Now, if qt = 0 then
set pˆt = v0,t = L. It is easy to verify that the new prices {p1, . . . , pˆt, . . . , pT} induce the same
behaviour by the consumer or consumers and, thus, produce the same revenue. Moreover,
the period t now satisfies the requirements of the theorem for s = t and j = 0. So suppose
qt ≥ 1. We now set
pˆt = min{vj,s + (t− s) · c : s 6 t; 0 ≤ j ≤ N ; vj,s + (t− s) · c > pt}
We claim (p1, . . . , pˆt, . . . , pT ) is a more profitable sequence of preannounced prices. To do this
we again desire that the consumer (or consumers) behaviour does not change. If so, the price
increase at time t will result in additional revenue. First, the price increase at time t will
not affect consumption by the consumer(s) in any period t′ < t. Second the price increase
at time t will not alter consumption in periods t′′ > t; making additional purchases at time
t and storing them for future consumption is even less desirable than before. It remains to
consider sales in period t. Recall there were originally qt sales in period t. Because there was
no storage, it must, by consumer rationality, be the case that vqt+1,t < pt ≤ vqt,t.
Thus, pt < vqt,t, otherwise pt does satisfy the requirements of the theorem. It follows that vqt,t
was a feasible option when selecting pˆt. Hence, pˆt ≤ vqt,t. Thus the price of the item at time
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t is still at most the marginal value the qtht unit (in the multi-buyer case, pˆt is at most the
value at period t of the consumer with the qtht highest valuation in that period). But does the
price increase from pt to pˆt now induce the consumer or consumers to now purchase early and
store for consumption at time t? This is not the case. Since qt > 0, we know by Lemma 3.1
that pt 6 ps + (t− s) · c for all s < t. Since by assumption pt 6= vj,s + (t− s) · c for any s 6 t
and for any j 6 N , we have that pt < ps + (t − s) · c. Now, by the minimality of t we have
that ps = vj′,r + (s− r) · c for some r ≤ s and 0 ≤ j
′ ≤ N . Hence
pt < ps + (t− s) · c = vj′,r + (s− r) · c+ (t− s) · c = vj′,r + (t− r) · c
It then follows, by the definition of pˆt, that pˆt 6 ps+(t−s)·c. Consequently, it is not beneficial
for the consumer or consumers to use storage and {p1, . . . , pˆt, . . . , pT} is a more profitable
solution for the retailer. Iterating the argument produces a sequence of preannounced prices
that satisfy the requirements of the theorem for every period t.
The structure provided by Theorem 3.3 allows us to construct an optimal preannounced
pricing strategy in polynomial time via a dynamic program. The key is that we search for
prices of the form pt = vj,s + (t − s) · c, for some s 6 t and some 0 ≤ j ≤ N . Intuitively,
this means we are matching a price pt with a value vj,s. Of course, this correspondence has
to satisfy numerous constraints in order to be rational and profit-maximizing.
To explain how to find the optimal correspondence, we begin with some definitions. For each
demand value vi,t we associate a 2D contour γi,t to the demand of the ith item in period t.
(Recall that demands are sorted by decreasing value in each period, that is, vi,t > vi+1,t.)
We then define a total ordering  over all the contours. Specifically, we say γi,t  γj,r if
vi,t + c · (r − t) 6 vj,r and t 6 r. To motivate this, assume the consumer is debating whether
to purchase and consume j items in period r or to purchase in period t < r and then store
the goods until period r. The best choice is determined by the ordering of the contours γi,t
and γj,r.
We denote by Ct = {γi,t : i ∈ [N ]} the set of contours associated with demands in period t.
Further, we set C0 to contain a dummy contour, C0 = {γ
∗} where γ  γ∗ for all γ ∈
⋃T
t=1 Ct.
We will view the selection of the dummy contour in time t as the assignment pt = L for some
huge L.
Now suppose we select a contour γj,s at time t. As described, this produces the price pt =
vj,s + (t − s) · c. In addition, this choice constrains the price choices for all periods r > t.
Specifically, such a price pr must correspond to a contour no higher than γj,s. Hence, the choice
of contours (excluding dummy contours) is non-increasing over time. To formalize this for the
dynamic program we use the following notation. Define Ft(γi,y) = {γ ∈ Ct ∪ {γi,y} : γ  γi,y}
where Ft(γi,y) is the feasible set of contours for period t, given that the lowest contour chosen
so far is γi,y. Given a contour γi,s and a time period t > s, we define pt(γi,s) = vi,s+ c · (t− s).
We then set qt(γi,s) = #{j ≥ 1 : vj,t ≥ pt(γi,s)} to be the number of items in period t with
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value at least pt(γi,s). Note that if there is no storage then qt(γi,s) is exactly the number of
sales in period t when prices are pt(γi,s). We are now ready to present a dynamic program
that calculates the optimal sequence of preannounced prices in polynomial time.
ALGORITHM 1: Optimal preannounced pricing mechanism
R(T + 1, γ)← 0 for all γ ∈
⋃T
τ=1 Cτ .
for t = T → 1 do
for each γi,s ∈
⋃t−1
τ=0 Cτ do
R(t, γi,s)← max{qt(γj,r) · pt(γi,r) +R(t+ 1, γj,r) : γj,r ∈ Ft(γi,s)}
S(t, γi,s)← argmaxγj,r{qt(γj,r) · pt(γi,r) +R(t+ 1, γj,r) : γj,r ∈ Ft(γi,s)}
end for
end for
return {p1(S(1, γ
∗)), p2(S(2,S(1, γ
∗))), . . .}
Theorem 3.4. The dynamic program computes an optimal preannounce pricing strategy.
Proof. We want to show that R(t, γi,s) computes the optimal revenue obtainable in period t
to T , given that the maximum price we may use in period t is induced by the contour γi,s.
That is, the maximum price pt is at most vi,s+(t−s)·c. We prove this by backwards induction
from the last period. For t = T , we have that R(t, γi,s) maximises the quantity times price
given the upper bound on price implied by γi,s, as desired. Now consider R(t, γi,s), for t < T .
Again, by Theorem 3.3 there exists an optimal pricing strategy in which the price at period
t is equal to pt(γi,r) for some γi,r ∈
⋃t
τ=1 Cτ . To maximise profits we wish to select a contour
in Ct; however, the corresponding price must not be above γi,s. Thus, the optimal choice,
S(t, γi,s), must either be γi,s itself or a lower contour in Ct. The objective is to maximise
revenue in period t plus revenues from periods t + 1 to T . The correctness of the procedure
follows as the latter has been calculated inductively.
The following lemma shows that the algorithm presented above is very efficient in terms of
time requirement.
Lemma 3.5. An optimal sequence (p1 . . . , pT ) of preannounced pricing can be computed in
time O(T · D2), where T is the number of periods and D is the total number of items in
demand (D 6 N · T ).
Proof. The outer loop covers T periods. The inner loop takes examines at most D counters
(one for each demand item). The two variable assignments require O(D) operations. Together
this takes time O(T ·D2).
We end this section by noting that for the model with divisible goods, Dudine et al. [2006] pro-
vided another dynamic program to compute efficiently the sequence of preannounced prices.
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One of appealing features of the algorithm presented here is the flexibility to work for arbitrary
consumer valuations.5
4 A Relationship between Preannounced Pricing Prof-
its and Contingent Pricing Profits
Recall, in the divisible storable good [Dudine et al., 2006], retailer profits under a prean-
nounced pricing mechanism are always higher than or equal to those obtained under a con-
tingent pricing mechanism. We saw an example in Section 2.3 showing this need not be
the case for an indivisible good. In this section, we quantify exactly how much more profits
a contingent pricing mechanism can generate than a preannounced pricing mechanism for
an indivisible good. Specifically, let ΠCP (G) and ΠPA(G) denote the retailer revenue in the
game G under contingent pricing and preannounced pricing respectively. Our main result
is that, for the multi-buyer case with N(G) consumers, there exists an example for which
ΠCP (G) = Ω(log(N(G)) · ΠPA(G)). Furthermore this result is tight, for any game G, we have
ΠCP (G) = O(log(N(G)) · ΠPA(G)). Before presenting these results, we give a simple exam-
ple to show that in the single-buyer case there are examples where the retailer can obtain
arbitrarily higher profits using a contingent pricing mechanism rather than a preannounced
pricing mechanism.
4.1 The Single-Buyer Case.
Here is a single-buyer example where profits for the contingent pricing mechanism are arbi-
trarily higher than for the preannounced pricing mechanism
Theorem 4.1. For any k ∈ N, there exists a single-buyer storable good game G such that
ΠCP (G) > k ·ΠPA(G).
Proof. We create a game G with T = 2 periods. The buyer receives zero value from consump-
tion in the first period. In the second period, the buyer has a marginal value of 1 + ǫ for the
first unit of consumption (for some small ǫ > 0), and a marginal value of 1
i
for the ith unit of
consumption, for 2 ≤ i ≤ N . This is summarized in Table 3. The storage costs are assumed
to be negligible, that is, c = 0.
Using a preannounced pricing strategy the maximum profit obtainable by the retailer is clearly
ΠPA(G) = 1+ǫ. On the other hand, the retailer can do far better by using a contingent pricing
5We remark that the model in Dudine et al. [2006] contains additional assumptions that are not required
here, such as the retailer revenue being a concave function of the price in each time period.
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Table 3: Single-Buyer Example with Profits arbitrarily Higher under Contingent Pricing than
under Preannounced Pricing
Item 1 2 3 · · · i · · · N
Marginal Value in Period t = 1 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
Marginal Value in Period t = 2 1+ǫ 1
2
1
3
· · · 1
i
· · · 1
N
mechanism. To see this, first consider what happens if the consumer refuses to buys any items
in the first period. The price in the second period will be then be the static monopoly price
of 1 + ǫ; the consumer surplus would then be zero. So suppose the retailer announces a price
of p1 = HN +
1
N
− 1+ ǫ in the first period (where HN =
∑N
i=1
1
i
). As discussed, the consumer
generates no surplus if she refuses to buy in period 1. What happens if the consumer buys one
unit at price p1 and stores it for consumption in period 2? Then, in the second period, if the
consumer buys k < N additional items, her marginal value for that final unit of consumption
is 1
k+1
. Therefore, given that the consumer bought exactly one unit in period 1, the optimal
price for the retailer is p2 =
1
N
in the second period. Consumer surplus over the two periods
is then(
1 + ǫ+
N∑
i=2
1
i
)
− (1 · p1 + (N − 1) · p2) = (HN + ǫ)−
(
HN +
1
N
− 1 + ǫ+
N − 1
N
)
= 0
Hence the consumer is no worse off by purchasing one item in the first period at p1 than if she
waits and buys only in the second period. The consumer has negative utility if she purchases
more than one unit in period one. Thus, we have an equilibrium where the consumer purchases
exactly one unit in period one with retailer’s profits of
ΠCP (G) = 1 · p1 + (N − 1) · p2 = HN +
1
N
− 1 + ǫ+
N − 1
N
= HN + ǫ
It is well-known thatHN > logN+
1
2
. Consequently, we have ΠCP ≥ logN ·ΠPA, as ǫ→ 0.
4.2 The Multi-Buyer Case.
Is it also the case that retailer profits can be arbitrarily higher under contingent pricing
mechanisms than under preannounced pricing mechanisms when there are a large number of
consumers? We remark that the example used to prove Theorem 4.1 does not extend to the
multi-buyer case. To see this, suppose we interpret Table 3 as a game with N(G) = N buyers
each with a unit demand. The optimal prices using the contingent pricing mechanism would
then be p1 = 1 + ǫ (one consumer buys) and p2 = 1/N (and the remaining N − 1 consumers
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buy). But this only yields a total profit that is less than 2 ·ΠPA. Intuitively, the reason why
higher profits cannot be extracted is because the N buyers do not cooperate. In contrast, in
the single-buyer setting, the retailer is able to exploit the fact that the buyer is willing to buy
at a “loss” in period 1 in order to obtain a surplus in period 2.
Nonetheless, we now show, via a far more complex example, that the retailer in the multi-
buyer setting can generate a multiplicative factor log(N(G)) more profits by using a contingent
pricing mechanism. This is interesting, and perhaps surprising, in light of the results of
Berbeglia et al. [2014] who examined a model of a durable good monopoly problem with N
atomic consumers and finite time horizon originally proposed by Bagnoli et al. [1989]. In
that model, Berbeglia et al. [2014] proved that retailer profits under a contingent pricing
mechanism are always within an additive constant (and within at most a multiplicative factor
of two) of profits under a preannounced pricing strategy. The model proposed by Bagnoli et al.
[1989] corresponds to a special case of the storable good problem studied here. Specifically,
to capture their model we simply assume each consumer has a positive valuation only in the
final period, that is, vi,t = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N and for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
6 This additive
constant bound does not extend to the more general storable goods problem studied in this
paper. Again, as in the single-buyer case, the ratio between the profits under a contingent
pricing mechanism over the profits under a preannounced pricing strategy can be unbounded.
Theorem 4.2. There exists an infinite sequence of games G1,G2, . . ., such that the number of
consumers is strictly increasing and that Π
CP (Gi)
ΠPA(Gi)
= Ω(log(N(Gi)) = Ω(log T ).
Proof. Take any integer n > 2. We create a game with T =
∑n
i=1 2
n−i = 2n − 1 periods. In
each period t ∈ [T ], there is exactly one consumer with positive valuation for the item; that
is, v1,t > 0 and vi,t = 0, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Furthermore, each consumer has a
positive valuation for the good in only one period. Specifically, we partition the time periods
into n blocks, {B1,B2, . . . ,Bn}. Here block Bk consists of 2
n−k consecutive time periods. Note
that
∑n
k=1 |Bk| = 2
n − 1 and so there are indeed T = 2n − 1 time periods in total. It remains
to assign, at each period t, a valuation to the only consumer who wishes to consume in that
period. If consumer i is the unique buyer with positive valuation in period t then we say that
i is the consumer of period t, or that i belongs to period t. (Given a set S of time periods, we
say that a consumer belongs to S if the consumer belongs to any period in S.) The consumer
belonging to any period in block Bk, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n, is given a valuation of vk = 2
k−1.
Again, we assume that storage costs are negligible, that is c = 0. Table 4.2 summarizes this
construction.
Let’s first calculate the retailer profit, ΠPA(G), under preannounced pricing. To do this, we
claim that there is an optimal preannounced pricing strategy in which prices do not change
6Essentially, we can view the all the consumers in the Bagnoli et al. [1989] model as only wishing to
consume the durable good in the final period. In those circumstances, it does not matter whether the good
is durable or simply storable.
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Table 4: Block Sizes and Valuations in the Multi-Buyer Game
Block Number 1 2 3 · · · s · · · n
Time Length 2n−1 2n−2 2n−3 · · · 2n−s · · · 2n−n = 1
Consumer Value 1 21 22 · · · 2s−1 · · · 2n−1
over time. Let {p1, p2, . . . , pT} denote an optimal preannounced pricing strategy. Consider
the largest t such that pt < pt+1. Because there are no storage costs no consumer in any
period s with s > t would buy at price pt+1. Thus, setting a price p
′
t+1 = pt at period t + 1
will not cause the retailer’s profits to decrease. On the other hand, take the largest t such
that pt > pt+1. If no consumer buys in period t then decreasing the price in period t down
to p′t = pt+1 can only increase profits. If at least one consumer does buy in period t at price
pt then that must be the consumer that belongs to period t; any other consumer will do
better by waiting to purchase in period t + 1. This means that the consumer from period t
has a valuation at least pt. By the construction of the game, this in turn implies that every
consumer belonging to a period s, with s > t, also has a valuation at least pt. Therefore,
even with a fixed price of pt between periods t + 1 to T all consumers in periods t + 1 to T
would still buy the item. This increases monopoly profits. It follows that there is a fixed price
strategy that yields optimal profits. Therefore, to compute ΠPA(G) we can restrict attention
to fixed price strategies. It is then easy to verify that the optimal fixed price is 1. Every
consumer will then purchase the good giving the retailer a profit of 1 in each time period,
and thus of T =
∑n−1
i=0 2
i = 2n − 1 in total. (Note also that N(G) = T = 2n − 1). Hence
ΠPA(G) = 2n − 1.
Next consider contingent pricing mechanisms. We will show that there is a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which the retailer extracts almost all the consumer surplus. This equilibrium
is composed of the following pair of strategies. The strategy of the retailer is to announce a
price equal to the value of the highest consumer yet to buy. The strategy of each consumer is
to buy the item in the earliest period t where the price is at most her valuation, provided the
consumer belongs to a period s ≥ t. Following Bagnoli et al. [1989], who studied a similar
strategy pairing in a different setting, we call the retailer’s strategy pacman and the consumers
strategies get-it-while-you-can.
To analyse this we denote by Gi,k a subgame in which the remaining consumers belong to
the set of blocks {Bi,Bi+1, . . . ,Bk}. That is, the consumers belong to a subset S ⊆
⋃k
j=i Bj .
Without loss of generality, we may assume that S contains at least one consumer of the block
Bk and that the subgame begins at a period t associated with block Bi. We wish to prove
that, in any subgame Gi,k, the pacman strategy is a best response to the consumer strategy
get-it-while-you-can. We proceed by induction on k − i. If k − i = 0 then all the remaining
consumers have a fixed value. It follows immediately that the pacman strategy is a best
response to get-it-while-you-can. Suppose that there are two blocks, that is, k − i = 1. Let
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|B˜i|, respectively |B˜k|, denote the number of active consumers in block i, respectively k. Note
that |B˜j | ≤ |Bj | as the set S in the subgame Gi,k need contain only a subset of the original
collection of customers in block Bj . Using the pacman strategy then yields profits at least:
|B˜k| · vk + (|B˜i| − 1) · vi = |B˜k| · 2 · vi + (|B˜i| − 1) · vi = (2 · |B˜k|+ |B˜i| − 1) · vi
Observe that in period 2, of the subgame Gi,k, we may make only |B˜i| − 1 sales as one of the
lower value consumers may only wish to purchase in the first period t of the subgame. The
only other logical strategy against get-it-while-you-can is for the retailer to announce a price
of vi in the first period t. This would cause each consumer to buy in the first time period
giving a profit of (|B˜k| + |B˜i|) · vi. But 2 · |B˜k| + |B˜i| − 1 ≥ |B˜k| + |B˜i|, and so the pacman
strategy is at least as profitable as this.
Before proceeding with the inductive step, denote by τP the number of periods required by the
pacman strategy to sell to (almost) every active consumer in Gi,k. Observe that τ
P 6 k− i+1
but that some consumers may not be able to buy the good. Specifically, the consumers (if
any) that do not buy all belong to the first k − i time periods, that is from period t up to
period t+k−i−1. All those periods are associated with blocks Bi and Bi+1, since the number
of periods in these two blocks adds up to at least 1 + 2k−i−1, which is not less than k − i for
all k > 2.
Now if the retailer announces a first price of vα = 2
α−1, for some α < k, then the active
consumers of blocks Bj with j > α will buy due to the get-it-while-you-can strategy. Period
t + 1 then begins a subgame with at least one fewer block in which, by induction, pacman
is the best response. Let Πα(Gi,k) denote the retailer revenue obtained by announcing a first
period price of vα (α < k). We can now write necessary and sufficient conditions for the
pacman strategy to provide a higher or equal revenue than any such deviation. Let τα be
the number of periods needed to sell to all the consumers (that buy) if the retailer announces
a first period price of vα and then follows the pacman strategy. Thus, τ
α > τP − (k − α).
The corresponding additional surplus generated by selling to potentially more consumers is
at most
(k − α) ·min[vα, vi+1]
To see this, recall that these k − α consumers belong to blocks Bi and Bi+1.
On the other hand, by setting an initial price of vα the retailer cannot obtain full value from
the consumers in the block Bk. There is at least one such consumer, so this causes the retailer
to lose at least vk− vα. To prove that pacman is a best response, it then suffices to show that
the potential gains of announcing a price vα do not compensate the losses. To show this, we
have
Πpacman(Gi,k)− Π
α(Gi,k) > (vk − vα)− (k − α) ·min[vα, vi+1]
= (2k−α − k + α− 1) · vα
> 0 [as k − α > 1]
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It follows that we have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the retailer
achieves near perfect price discrimination. Every consumer except (possibly) the first n − 1
consumers buy the good at exactly their valuation. The revenue obtained is therefore
ΠCP =
n∑
i=1
2i · 2n−i − (n− 1) · 1 = n · 2n − (n− 1) ≥ n · (2n − 1) = n · ΠPA
Recall that the number of consumers in this game is N(Gi) = T = 2
n − 1. Thus
ΠCP ≥ logN(Gi) · Π
PA
as desired.
The following lemma shows that Theorem 4.2 is tight.
Lemma 4.3. For any game G, Π
CP (G)
ΠPA(G)
= O(log(N(G)) + log T ).
Proof. Let ΠF (G) denote the optimal profit that can be obtained by the retailer in G by
setting a fixed price along the game. Clearly, ΠPA(G) > ΠF (G). Let v1, v2, . . . , vℓ denote,
in decreasing order, the set of all consumer valuations over all time periods. Observe that
ℓ ≤ N(G) · T . The contingent pricing mechanism cannot extract more profit than a perfect
price discrimination mechanism. Thus
ΠCP (G) 6
ℓ∑
k=1
vk
Thus, it suffices to show the following inequality:
ΠF (G) ·Hℓ >
ℓ∑
k=1
vk, (2)
where Hℓ =
∑ℓ
i=1
1
i
= O(log(N(G) · T )) = O(log(N(G) + log T ). To do this, set j∗ =
argmaxj{j · vj : j ∈ [l]}. Thus, a retailer that announces a static price of vj∗ would obtain
a profit of j∗ · vj∗ = Π
F (G). Without loss of generality, scale the consumer valuations such
that j∗ · vj∗ = 1. We then have, for all i ∈ [ℓ], that i · vi 6 1. Hence, vi 6
1
i
. Inequality (2)
follows.
5 Concave Storage Costs
We now examine our model under the more general setting of concave storage costs. Here
the marginal cost of storage is non-decreasing function in quantity. Let C : N → R>0 be an
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arbitrary concave function such that C(q) denotes the cost of storing q units of the good for
one period. (Here C(0) = 0.) Because linear costs are a special case of concave costs, the
example in Theorem 4.2 shows the contingent pricing mechanism can produce an Ω(logN)
factor more profits than the optimal preannounced pricing mechanism in the case of concave
costs. Furthermore, it can be seen that the O(logN) upper bound of Lemma 4.3 also applies
in the case of concave storage cost. We now examine the question of whether storage occurs
under preannounced pricing mechanisms. The answer differs for the single-buyer and multi-
buyer settings.
5.1 The Single-Buyer Case.
We extend Theorem 3.2 from linear to concave storage costs in the single-buyer setting.
Specifically, we show that there exists an optimal price-commitment strategy under which no
storage occurs.
Theorem 5.1. In the single-buyer setting where storage costs are concave, there always exists
a revenue maximising price commitment strategy that induces no storage.
Proof. Let D1 denote any optimal price-commitment strategy for the retailer, i.e the sequence
of T prices, and let D2 denote the buyer best response to D1, i.e. an optimal sequence
of the number of items bought in each time period. Let the storage levels under D2 be
S1, S2, . . . , ST−1, where St denotes the number of units stored from period t to period t + 1
for all t ∈ [T − 1]. Let Q(D2) =
∑T−1
t=1 St be the total amount of storage. Without loss
of generality, we assume that given two purchasing schedules that yield the same utility the
consumer picks the one with the lowest total storage. Note that the total storage cost incurred
by the consumer is
∑T−1
t=1 C(St).
Let ∆C(q) = C(q+1)−C(q). Thus, ∆C(q) represents the additional cost of storing one extra
unit, given that x−1 items are already stored. To conduct our analysis, we assign the storage
costs incurred over the units as follows. We order the items in increasing order of purchase
time; we arbitrarily order any units purchased in the same period. We now assume that units
are consumed in a first-in-first-out (FIFO) fashion; given a choice, the buyer consumes the
unit purchased earliest. Observe that the storage cost at period t is
C(St) =
St∑
ℓ=1
∆C(ℓ− 1)
As we have an ordering on the items, we may assign to the ℓth of these St units the storage
cost ∆C(ℓ− 1).
Assume that Q(D2) > 0. Take an interval I consisting of the periods {i, i+1, . . . , i+ k = τ},
such that Si = Sτ = 0 and St > 0 for all i < t < τ . By adding a dummy time period 0
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with S0 = 0, such an interval must exist as ST = 0. Next, let α denote the last period in the
I \ {τ} at which the consumer bought an item. Thus qα > 0 and qt = 0 for all α < t < τ .
Because Sτ−1 > 0 and Sτ = 0 we have that consumption xτ at time τ is positive and strictly
exceeds the number of items qτ purchased in that period. Moreover, we claim that every item
consumed at period τ was bought in period α. Suppose not. Then by the FIFO policy every
item purchased at time α is consumed in period τ , and at least one item purchased in period
β is consumed in period τ , where β < α is the last period before α at which there was a
purchase. Instead of purchasing that item at time β for consumption at time τ , the consumer
could have purchased it at time α. By viewing this as the last of the resultant Sα + 1 items
stored at time α, we see that this does not affect the storage cost of any other item bought
in any time period. Thus, by consumer rationality, the price paid at time β plus the storage
cost for the item over the interval [β, α] must be less than the price announced at period α.
Specifically
pβ +∆C(Sβ − 1) + ∆C(Sβ+1 − 1) + . . .+∆C(Sα−1 − 1) < pα
But then, by concavity of the storage costs, it is better for the consumer to purchase all of
the items currently bought in period α, in period β instead. Thus, as claimed, every item
consumed in period τ was bought in period α.
Now suppose the retailer modifies her price commitment strategy by changing the price at
period τ to
p′τ = pα +
τ−1∑
j=α
∆C(|Sj | − 1).
Call the resulting price-commitment strategy for the retailer D′1. Faced now with D
′
1, we
claim the consumer utility cannot decrease if she purchases as under D1 except that she buys
Sτ−1 items less in period α and Sτ−1 items more in period τ . Under S, the price and storage
costs associated with the last item bought at period α is
pα +
τ−1∑
j=α
∆C(|Sj | − 1)
But this is exactly the price p′τ . By FIFO and the assignment rule for storage costs, postponing
the purchase of that item until time τ will not alter the storage costs assigned to any other
item (note that storage quantities after period τ remain unchanged). Thus the consumer is
indifferent to postponing the purchase of the item until time τ when the retailer uses D′1.
But by the concavity of the storage costs, a similar argument implies that the consumer may
postpone the purchase of every item bought in period α (that is, Sτ−1) until period τ without
a reduction in utility under S ′
In addition, we claim that the consumer cannot obtain a higher utility using another strategy
against the new prices. If so, an improvement was also possible against the old prices, a
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contradiction. To see this, recall that the only storage modification induced by the retailer
change of strategy from D1 to D
′
1 was a reduction in storage from period α to period τ of
Sτ−1. By FIFO and the assignment rule for storage costs, this storage reduction can only
contribute to an increase in the storage costs for a potential new item bought before period
τ , and for items already bought before period τ the storage costs remain the same. On the
other hand, assume that it is now beneficial to buy at period τ , for price p′τ , an addition item
or items for consumption at time τ or later. But then, by concavity, it was also beneficial
to do so under the old prices. Thus, the postponement strategy is optimal against the new
prices.
To conclude, observe that the new prices yield a higher profit for the retailer than the old
prices as p′τ > pα. This contradicts the optimality of D1. Thus, there is an optimal solution
without storage.
5.2 The Multi-Buyer Case.
Unlike in the single-buyer case, Theorem 3.2 cannot be extended to the more general setting
of concave costs when there are multiple buyers.
Theorem 5.2. There are instances of the multi-buyer setting where storage costs are concave
in which every revenue maximising price commitment strategy induces some storage.
Proof. We provide a simple example with T = 3 time periods. Let the storage cost function
C : N→ R>0 be defined as:
C(q) :=
{
1.5 if q = 1
1.5 + ǫ if q = 2
Here ǫ is a tiny positive number. Now let there be N = n1 + n2 + 1 buyers where n1 and n2
are very large numbers. The first n1 consumers have a value of 1 in the first period and zero
in later periods. The second n2 consumers have zero value in the first two periods and a value
of 4 in the last period. Finally the last consumer has a value of 2.75 in the second period, a
value of 3 in the third period and no value in the first period.
One strategy for the retailer is to set p1 = 1, p2 =∞, p3 = 4. In that case, n1 consumers would
buy and consume at t = 1, n2 consumers would buy and consumer at t = 3, and the remaining
consumer would buy at t = 1 two units incurring in a storage cost of 1.5 + 1.5 + ǫ = 3 + ǫ.
This pricing strategy yields a profit for the retailer of (n1 + 2) · 1 + n2 · 4. Observe that is
almost optimal in the sense that all except one consumer pay their total valuation.
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Suppose there exists another pricing strategy (p′1, p
′
2, p
′
3) that is at least as profitable as the
one mentioned above, but that induces no storage. Since n1 and n2 are very large numbers,
any such price commitment strategy requires that the first n1 buyers pay a price of 1 and the
n2 consumers pay a price of 4. Thus p
′
1 = 1 and p
′
3 = 4.
If the remaining consumer buys at period 1, she obtains an utility of 2.75 + 3− 2 · 1− (1.5 +
ǫ)− 1.5 = 0.75− ǫ. Thus in order for the consumer to buy at period 2 (and not use storage)
at a price p′2 her utility has to be at least equal to 0.75 − ǫ. If the consumer buys one unit
at t = 2 we have that 2.75− p′2 > 0.75− ǫ. Therefore, p
′
2 6 2 + ǫ. On the other hand, if the
consumer buys two units at t = 2 we have that 2.75+ 3− 2 · p′2− 1.5 > 0.75− ǫ. This implies
that p′2 6 1.875+ ǫ/2. Observe now than in any of these cases, p
′
2 needs to be so low that the
n2 consumers would always prefer to buy at t = 2 and store rather than to buy at t = 3. As
a result, we proved that in this game every optimal price commitment strategy induces some
storage.
6 Conclusions and future research
In this paper we studied the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolistic retailer who sells
indivisible storable goods to strategic consumers under a finite time horizon. The case where
storable goods are arbitrarily divisible has been studied by Dudine et al. [2006]. We focused
in the understanding of two major pricing mechanisms: (1) preannounced pricing, where the
retailer announces at the beginning of the game the price to be charged at each time period;
(2) contingent pricing, the retailer announces prices sequentially at each time period, which
means that the price announced is allowed to be contingent to game history.
First, we showed that computing the optimal preannounced pricing policy can be done in
polynomial time (specifically in O(N2T 3) time). This result is in line with divisible goods
model where the authors have shown that finding the optimal preannounced pricing can be
done also efficiently by solving a different dynamic program (see supplemental appendix B in
Dudine et al. [2006]).
We constructed a simple example to show that under the contingent pricing policy rather
than the preannounced pricing mechanism, (i) prices can be lower, (ii) retailer revenues can
be higher, and (iii) consumer surplus can be higher. Surprisingly, these three facts are in
complete contrast to the case of a retailer selling divisible storable goods [Dudine et al., 2006].
Intuitively, under contingent pricing, the retailer can sometimes extract more revenue when
the goods are indivisible by performing some price discrimination difficult to overcome for the
consumer. When the retailer tries to perform a similar price discrimination under the divisible
goods setting, the consumer can finely optimize the (continuous) quantities bought, making
the price discrimination less effective. The example illustrates precisely this phenomenon. We
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then proceed to quantify how much more profitable can the contingent pricing mechanism
be with respect to preannounced pricing. We showed that for a market with N consumers,
a contingent policy can produce a multiplicative factor of Ω(logN) more revenues than a
preannounced policy. This is surprising, since to our knowledge, all previous monopoly models
with a finite number of periods have the property that the contingent pricing mechanism
cannot significantly outperform the preannounced pricing mechanism. Since preannounced
pricing strategies are typically easy to implement and popular with consumers, this means
there is little practical benefit for a retailer to explore the use of more complex contingent
pricing mechanisms. Our results, however, provide a setting in which it may indeed be
beneficial for the retailer to explore such options.
This paper leaves interesting questions for future research. One of them is to extend the
preannounced pricing algorithm of this paper to more general settings such as when storage
costs are concave or convex. Given that under concave costs, consumers might store goods
under preannounced pricing, the construction of such algorithm might not be simple. While
our results show that there are cases where the retailer revenue is much larger using contingent
pricing rather than preannounced pricing, it is unclear whether the opposite is also true. That
is, are there cases where the revenue obtained using a preannounced pricing is arbitrarily larger
than by using a contingent pricing mechanism? Another research direction is to characterize
the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium of the price contingent mechanism. Berbeglia et al.
[2014] characterized the subgame perfect equilibrium for a durable good pricing problem
(which is special case of the problem studied here) and showed that such equilibrium can
be computed in polynomial time. Extending such characterization or providing a hardness
result for the problem studied in this paper is an interesting challenge. Finally, it would be
interesting to extend the model studied in this paper by incorporating additional constraints
appearing often in practice such as, for example, imposing an extra fixed cost every time a
consumer makes an order (i.e. ordering cost).
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